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The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War

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destroyed. The admirals believed that aggressive patrols by the surface fleet had the best chance to destroy German submarines—ideally at a faster rate than new ones could be built—and that this in turn would ensure the safety of the merchant fleet. Significantly, while allied merchant shipping was being sunk at a steady and increasing rate throughout late 1916 and early 1917, the number of enemy submarines destroyed was also rising. In short, the Royal Navy did not see a problem, while the government most certainly did. This is an excellent example of two organizations within the same country using different measures of effectiveness. What changed in April 1917? The tonnage of merchant ships being sunk dramatically increased at a record rate—prompting the government finally to *demand* a revised strategy—while at the same time the number of enemy submarines destroyed notably decreased. Thus the dominant indicators for *both* the government and the Admiralty deteriorated at such a rate that both organizations were finally ready for change. Moreover, when the use of convoys began, not only did the tonnage losses drop dramatically but the Navy discovered that convoys were actually more effective in destroying enemy submarines. Everyone was happy. The strategy altered, and the dominant indicators stabilized.

Gartner's other case studies are equally intriguing. Social science methodology can often produce mind-numbing models, statistical quagmires, and impenetrable jargon, but mercifully that is not the case here. This work is readable, clear, and concise. Strategic assessment in war is vital because it can directly affect strategy and policy, which in turn can directly affect the outcome. This is a fascinating and important book that deserves a close reading by all military strategists.

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Haass, Richard N. *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997. 148pp. $24.95

Richard Haass continues with this book to advance clear thinking about and cogent analysis of U.S. foreign policy. His strong and authoritative prose has helped an entire generation to understand the Cold War and the end of the Cold War. In *The Reluctant Sheriff*, Haass first reviews U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and then discusses the problematic and challenging nature of contemporary world affairs. He then takes the discussion from the problem stage to a suggested solution—a doctrine of "regulation."

The book's title does not sufficiently reflect the depth of Haass's thinking or the width of his prescriptions. Where *The Reluctant Sheriff* is both creative and provocative, the subtitle does not alert the unsuspecting reader to his proposal for a new theoretical framework, complete with appropriate conceptual development and policy implications.

In the first chapters, the reader's attention is directed to the doctrine of containment, which provides intellectual structure and framework for policy during the period of the Cold

War. Haass emphasizes that it was a highly regulated world then, with a comfortable level of orderliness resulting from a remarkable degree of international consensus on the primacy of the general and global good over the particular and local.

The post–Cold War world (a phrase which the author remarks is redolent "of where people know they have been, not where they are now, much less where they are heading") is one of deregulation. It is an era of competing visions, simultaneous integration and fragmentation, uneven change, and instability. Haass identifies three problematic trends: (1) loosening of international relations, with new centers of decision making, corresponding diffusion of power, and absence of universally accepted norms; (2) weakening of the nation-state; and (3) the widespread appeal of democratic and market-oriented models. He concludes that while there are both positive and negative aspects to this period of deregulation, the post–Cold War era is not likely to be stable, due to a lack of regularized behavior. He advocates a new set of norms predicated on the assumption that parties "subscribe to a set of norms [because] they realize they are better off if they do, or because reluctant members of the international community are forced to go along." He contends that the United States should take on this role, because other regulators are unavailable (leadership by default); he offers the supporting argument that a policy of regulation would be the most effective way to support and enhance U.S. interests.

Haass argues that the suggested alternative doctrines of hegemony, isolationism, Wilsonianism, economism, humanitarianism, and realism are based on fallacious or overly idealistic assumptions that inevitably lead to failed policy. The doctrine of "regulation" is based on the assumption that order is a prerequisite for and integral to the peaceful development of other economic and political goals. Regulation would help establish norms of regular interaction, set the parameters of acceptable behavior, establish procedures for handling disputes, and offer a final resort when individual actors do not comply with internationally established rules. Whether he proposes this as an end state or a transition to another doctrine is unclear. What is suggested may simply he a set of ideas that would ensure a modicum of order while a new consensus is being built.

To enact the policy of regulation, the author suggests, the United States should take the leadership role of "sheriff," with other countries volunteering to be the posse—informal coalitions based on the nature of a given problem, not simply as a consequence of former alliance structures or membership in international organizations. The tools of a policy of "regulation" are those familiar to students of international relations, such as defense, intelligence, foreign assistance, and diplomacy. These tools are to be used separately and in an integrated fashion in support of policy goals—which are definable and doable, for which the benefits outweigh the costs, and in which the ratio of benefits to costs outweighs that of other policy tools. They should he used in concert with other states whenever possible.

The goals and implied benefits of a policy of regulation are myriad: suppression of difficult actors; defense of U.S. territory against terrorism; support of preventive diplomacy, nation building and economic interests; control of illegal immigrations; support of allies, and so on. Haass concludes with three practical suggestions as to how the United States can bridge the gap between the demands of regulating a deregulated world and those of a society reluctant to play the role of sheriff, to prioritize, develop leadership and related alliances, or retain the means for policy effectiveness.

Haass's use of the metaphor of the United States as world "sheriff" is intellectually provocative. It brings to mind old western films with such characters as the self-effacing Jimmy Stewart as leader of a citizen group forced to take action against the bad guys, strapping on the guns only when forced to by the actions of the villains against the innocent (usually a feisty but helpless woman). Leading a group of concerned citizens, the sheriff, riding a big white stallion and clear in his purpose, makes law and enforces rough justice.

The picture had a certain appeal, but the reality was rather grim. The need for a hero-sheriff reflected a lack of systematic government, resulting in vigilantism, extra-judicial hangings, and a world in which rough justice predominated. Authority was uncertain, and law was referred to only in support of final actions. Due process was subsumed by expediency. (Perhaps Richard Haass did not intend for the metaphor to be taken to this length? Intentionally or not, the title inspires more than its share of creative thinking.) So, taking the metaphor further, the roles of sheriff and posse disappeared, because rough justice had to be replaced by a regularized system of justice that supported the values, principles, and processes of a democracy. Officers of the law, sworn to serve and protect but with clear limits to their authority, replaced sheriffs and citizen posses.

The analogy is clear. When the world is in a frontier stage there may be a perceived need for a sheriff and posse, but they will eventually be replaced by a system of law and order. Herein lies the dilemma. A sheriff-and-posse system is not the norm, nor is it legally based. There is no set of organizing principles, no "elected" center of decision making, and no enforcement mechanism based on a legal authority. The rule is expediency and self-interest. Is the call for a sheriff-posse system of international regulation consistent with a call for a more normative international order?

"So many ideas and so few pages"—one of the problems of this book is that it so engages the mind that many other questions arise which should be addressed. For example, Haass (never one to shy away from controversy) suggests that the budgets of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the intelligence community be maintained at current levels, but he makes no suggestion as to how this policy amalgam of regulation might dictate internal changes in the role and structures of those organizations.

Another issue may be one of communication. How do other people and their governments feel about the United States taking on the role of "sheriff"? Haass suggests the United

States act as sheriff by encouraging, supporting, and enforcing new orderly relationships between international actors. The authority for doing so is not just hegemony but "acknowledged leadership." This linguistic distinction may or may not make sense to the rest of the world. Will this be perceived as cultural arrogance? Hegemony with a white hat? Raw power? Impotence? More importantly, will those perceptions and interpretations limit the possibility of forging coalitions?

The Fall 1997 edition of *Foreign Affairs* contains the thinking of a number of authors who see U.S. foreign policy as at a "breakpoint" in history. According to them, the United States during the Cold War produced a clear and reflective foreign policy, because it understood the "enemy" and its own interests and capability. The framework of analysis and concepts, and the resulting policy, were integrated. Haass is one of the clearest spokesmen for this model. As with many authors writing from experience gained during the Cold War and from "inside the Beltway," Haass takes as his reference point the past fifty years rather than the whole evolution of U.S. foreign policy.

The author, though often identified as a "realist," is remarkably idealistic, perhaps justifiably so. He appears to assume (or perhaps only hope) that the motivations for U.S. foreign policy will be consistently good and that the pursuit of U.S. national interests will seldom, if ever, be antagonistic to the support of justice, equality, law, or the freedom of others. Perhaps the last few pages, in which he calls for domestic support of foreign policy goals, reflects his faith that democratic principles and practices may constrain foreign policy directions antagonistic to those ideals in the international arena. This book is an excellent illustration of idealistic objectives pursued in a realist manner.

This is one of many recent publications that have tapped the intellectual resources and carefully honed skills of a foreign policy guru to interpret contemporary foreign affairs, predict the future, and suggest appropriate U.S. foreign policy.

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Turner, Stansfield. *Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997. 163pp. $21

One might not think that 163 pages would be enough to address adequately an issue as weighty as nuclear weapons. However, Admiral Stansfield Turner manages to pack quite a potent message in this relatively short book. Using layman's language, he systematically lays out the problems posed by nuclear weapons, then proposes a thoughtful and pragmatic plan to lessen them. He draws heavily from his extensive professional contacts—a virtual "who's who" of scholars, scientists, politicians, military leaders, and world-renowned nuclear experts—and combines their information with his own personal experience in order to tell his story from an "insider's" point of view. The result is a readable, well researched,